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versity Press, 2011, 220 pp.
The book can be divided into two parts. The first part, comprising the 
opening two chapters, is a diatribe against religion, religious institutions, 
individual faith, and the concept of God. The following five chapters criti-
cally discuss some of the traditional arguments for God’s existence, argue 
for his non-existence, mostly by showing that the concept of God is use-
less for sciences, culture, ethics and aesthetics.
The first part is reminiscent of Richard Dawkins in both content and 
style. There is a lot of anger, resentment and blindness to any positive role 
religion might have played in human evolution and civilization. To How-
son’s mind, religions are totalitarian, anti-individualistic systems of ideas 
in which human beings unquestioningly, without a trace of doubt, slav-
ishly believe. This view is supported by many well-known examples of 
religious fundamentalism. Of course, Islamic terrorism is most prominent, 
without ever suggesting that a great majority of sunni and shia leaders 
openly and repeatedly distance themselves from such activities, while the 
leading Muslim intellectuals publicly voice their accusations of the activi-
ties of a handful of extremists like Bin Laden. On page 9, Howson writes: 
“The same uncompromising message is conveyed on the numerous jihad-
ist websites urging believers everywhere to enlist in the war against the 
enemies of Allah, with the Koran and hadiths cited in support”. Howson 
is right that Islamic fundamentalists call for Holy war, but he makes no 
difference between the Greater Jihad and the Lesser Jihad. The latter is the 
war against infidels, but the Koran gives it a subordinate role in relation 
to former, the internal war of the soul against her bad affections. Distorted 
religious views and practices can hardly serve as a model for a balanced 
critique of religion.
Howson’s attitude to Christianity is no less severe. Predictably, there 
are repeated references to the cases of paedophilia in the Catholic priest-
hood and the shady way the Church dealt with these cases. No doubt these 
are heinous actions and attempts to cover them up are no less wicked. But 
again, these are aberrations, not norms. A large number of priests are nor-
mal human beings, not bloodthirsty child molesters. Missionaries in the 
Third world countries, Theresian sisters, scholastic philosophers and mys-
tics of the present and past give a different picture of Christianity, much 
richer and kinder than the one Howson is determined to paint.
“God will tolerate no disobedience or any challenge to, or even doubt 
about, his authority,” Howson writes on p. 6. However, what about Au-
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gustine’s ego sum dubitans? Or mystics such as St. Theresa of Avila who 
permanently reviewed her emotions and faith in God? Or, more recently, 
Mother Theresa, who openly admitted that she was going to lose her faith 
in God? There is a passage in the Talmud, for instance, in which God 
expresses satisfaction with the rabbis who defeated Him in discussion, 
indicating that God wants people to question their views.
One of Howson’s main arguments against Abrahamic religions is 
their attitude towards women. He cites at length cases of abuse of women 
under Shari’ah law and of their degradation in the Bible, but conveniently 
passes over the crucial role of women in these religions. Think of the role 
of woman in the Jewish Shabbat, of Jesus’ commitment to women (Mary 
Magdalene was the first person who saw resurrected Jesus), of the roles of 
Aisha and Khadijah, Mohammed’s wives, and of Fatima, Rashidun Ali’s 
wife, in Islam. It is ironic that in place of religious morality, Howson in-
vokes the Greek eudaimonistic ethics, forgetting that its proponents hardly 
had a more refined attitude toward women, slaves and barbarians.
In the second chapter, Howson criticizes Gould’s notion of “non-
overlapping magisteria”. He finds it a disingenuous excuse for religion. 
“True, we are witnessing an evolving religion, stressing increasingly its 
sacramental and numinous aspects and moving further away from what 
might be even remotely testable claims about reality,” claims Howson 
(40), but one wonders if that is entirely fair. Many religious people flee 
from rational explication of their faith, but that does not make faith unten-
able or unfounded. Many authors writing on science and religion plausibly 
argue in favour of compatibility of religious truth and scientific theories. 
Insisting that a majority of believers take the creation story literally is just 
plain wrong. Bible has been read at different levels – literal, anagogic, 
mystic, allegoric, numeric and so on – and one wonders why Howson does 
not take that into account.
The second part of the book is different and philosophically more in-
teresting. At the beginning of the third chapter, Howson provides a discus-
sion of Pascal’s wager. First, he shows that Pascal’s pragmatic argument 
fails because arbitrary religious beliefs cannot serve to make mathematical 
inferences concerning future benefits. Second, utility theories in modern 
probability mathematics are limited to a finite value in order to avoid in-
consistency. The only complaint is that Howson fails to mention a disturb-
ing consequence of Pascal’s argument, namely that atheists, even if they 
live virtuously and consistently perform good deeds, would be doomed to 
eternal torment.
Next on Howson’s agenda is debunking theistic uses of Bayes’s The-
orem. As an introduction, Howson refers to the Prosecutor’s Fallacy: if the 
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truth of a hypothesis would make some phenomenon extremely unlikely 
to be observed, then the observation of that phenomenon makes the hy-
pothesis correspondingly unlikely to be true. In other words, if the occur-
rence of event E is assigned a very small probability by hypothesis H, then 
the occurrence of E implies a correspondingly small probability of H. So 
if H assigns to event E a much smaller probability than H’, then the prob-
ability of H, given the occurrence of E, must be correspondingly smaller 
than that of H’. What Howson says is that there are four logical rules 
that are used to justify the preceding statements: (1) logically equivalent 
propositions have the same probability; (2) the probability of a necessary 
truth is 1 and the probability of a necessary falsehood is 0; (3) if A and B 
are two propositions which cannot both be true, then the probability that 
either A is true or B is true is the sum of their individual probabilities; (4) 
the logical equation Bּ(B→A)≡A·B.
If we denote the probability of hypothesis (H) given evidence (E) as 
Prob (H│E) (instead of (E→H)) and the probability of evidence (E) given 
hypothesis (H) as Prob (E│H) (in place of (H→E)), then the inserting of 
the rule of contraposition leads to the identity equation Prob (E│H)≡Prob 
(H│E). Rule (4) gives us the equation Prob (H·E)≡Prob (E)ּProb (H│E) and 
Prob (E·H)≡Prob (E│H)· Prob (H). Since the two equations are equivalent, 
it implies the first crucial equation: Prob (H│E)≡Prob(H)·[Prob(E│H)/
Prob (E)]. It is the Bayes’s Theorem equation and it can be expressed as 
follows: if a hypothesis makes the evidence more likely than it would 
otherwise have been, then the evidence increases the probability of the 
hypotheses. The probabilities Prob (E or H) are prior probabilities (prob-
abilities in the light of implicit evidence) and the probabilities Prob (E│H 
or H│E) are posterior probabilities (probabilities in the light of explicit 
evidence). If we insert the probability equation of “getting a bet” which is 
odd=p/(1-p) (odd=chance for getting a bet; “p” and “(1–p)” are the prob-
abilities of truth of two opposing propositions), then, when we replace 
the symbols (let “p” be the probability H in the light of E and “(1–p)” the 
probability (–H) in the light of E), we have the posterior odd, odd≡Prob 
(H│E)/ Prob (–H│E). When we insert Bayes’s equation, it is implied that 
post odd≡Prob [(H)/Prob (–H)]·{[Prob (E│H)/Prob (E)]/[Prob (E│–H)/
Prob (E)]}. The first member of the product is the prior odd, and since 
Prob (E) truncates, the second part of the product is Bayes’s factor λ. Then 
the given equation is post odd≡ λ·pr odd, and this equation is often called 
the odds form of Bayes’s theorem.
With the simple switch of H with H’ in the equation, we have the 
equation Prob (H│E)/Prob (H’│E)≡[Prob (E│H)·Prob (H)]/[Prob 
(E│H’)·Prob(H’)]. The crux of Howson’s argument is that theists identify 
the probability Prob (H│E) and Prob (E│H). Let us suppose that H is the 
307Recenzije • Book Reviews 
hypothesis for design creation and H’ is the hypothesis for materialism. The 
value probability of E (for instance the evidence of molecular replicators) 
in the light of the design hypothesis is equal to the value probability of the 
design hypothesis in the light of the evidence of molecular replicators. This 
implies, then, that the value probability of the evidence of replicators in the 
light of materialistic hypothesis is equal to, etc. Furthermore, if the value 
probability Prob (E│H) is more likely than Prob (E│H’), then the value 
probability Prob (H│E) is also more likely than Prob (H’│E). Unfortu-
nately for theists and believers, this case is possible only when the values of 
Prob (E│H) and Prob (H│E) are equal to 0. Very simple arithmetic calculus 
shows that on the right side of the equation we can have Prob (E│H)>Prob 
(E│H’), but this fact doesn’t imply Prob (H│E)>Prob (H’│E). The value 
of posterior probabilities depends on the value of prior probabilities Prob 
(H) and Prob (H’). So, in the end, socially and culturally embedded degree 
of belief in the inviolability of God’s existence blurs even those aspects of 
human cognition that are based on purely analytical views.
After showing that theists are not able to prove the existence of God 
by using mathematical theories and calculations of probability, Howson 
reflects negatively on the classical arguments for God’s existence. In the 
fourth, and partly in the fifth chapter, he deals with the cosmological ar-
gument, and he chooses the kalam argument. Very briefly, the argument 
is that whatever has a beginning in time, it must be caused; the universe 
has a beginning in time, therefore it is caused; and, of course, it is caused 
by God. Surely, contemporary mathematical theories refute the kalam’s 
premises and the conclusion, showing that it is possible to go to infinity 
of causes and effects. Also, there are views in quantum cosmology that 
the universe has no beginning and hence needs no cause. As concerns 
mathematics, there are no objections. As for physics, quantum cosmology 
theories are notoriously difficult to verify. Howson offers similar objec-
tions regarding the Principle of sufficient reason in the fifth chapter, given 
that the series of contingent beings and sufficient reasons for their exist-
ence can go (as above theories claim) to infinity.
In the fourth chapter, Howson especially attacks the fine-tuning theory, 
which is actually a critique of all teleological arguments and arguments 
from design. He doesn’t care to distinguish various forms of such argu-
ments from the past and present, though he does argue that not even the 
weak anthropic principle, appealed to by his fellow atheists, is necessary 
for a refutation of fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. Of course, 
this is supposed to strengthen the atheist position. One interesting point 
that Howson makes concerns the invariance and complexity of the initial 
conditions. Namely, using the instance of a bowl of water, Howson shows 
why the perfect alignment of the conditions of the universe has such a 
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small probability. Let us suppose that a bowl of water has temperature in 
the interval between 10 and 90 degrees centigrade. The probability that the 
water has temperature lower than 50 degrees, is 50%. However, let us sup-
pose that the same object is in the interval between 1/90 and 1/10 degrees; 
then the probability that the water has temperature above 1/50 degrees is 
90%. From this clear example, Howson persuades the reader that, because 
of the extreme complexity and the many conditions that make our uni-
verse, all tuned components have a very low probability of being such as 
they are, but they are such due solely to the complexity of the universe.
At the end of the fifth chapter, Howson analyses the ontological argu-
ment as proposed by Anselm and Descartes. He doesn’t mention any other 
contemporary formulation other than Plantinga’s. If he states counterar-
guments, he refers to Kant or to the intuition that nothing comes out of 
nothing. In attacking Plantinga’s formulation of the ontological argument, 
Howson refers to Kant’s rejection of existence as a predicate, but ignores 
the distinction between existence and necessary existence. Besides, he 
thinks that, due to the incompatibility of God’s attributes, the concept of 
God becomes a contradiction like a round triangle.
In the two chapters before last, Howson tries to demonstrate uselessness 
of God in the areas of ethics, philosophy of mind, mathematics and aesthe-
tics. In ethics, as in science, God is not needed to complement the unknowns 
in these areas: “To claim therefore, as some do, that some observable phe-
nomenon or other is intrinsically or in principle inexplicable by scientific 
means seems even less likely to be a profitable undertaking” (136).
Howson indicates three points of morality that need clarification in 
order to avoid the introduction of the hypothesis of God. First, the fact of 
altruism. For Howson, evolutionary theories of kin, reciprocal and indirect 
altruism resolve this problem beyond all doubt. Second, the origins of the 
prohibitions and restrictive norms. Howson refers here to Hume’s utilitar-
ian ethics and its strategy of moral equilibrium (Farmer’s dilemma, Grim 
Trigger, Stag Hunt). For Hume, someone does something for other not 
out of decency and love, but because he expects some benefit, that is, he 
wishes that the other reciprocates. Each one of them makes a promise to 
behave in this way and the failure to keep the promise is sanctioned. Thus, 
according to Hume’s theory, the man is one who creates social values and 
moral duties exclusively on the basis of human interaction, and restrictive 
measures are there to secure these values and duties. So the second prob-
lematic point is circumvented with the help of Hume’s theory. The third 
and the most embarrassing questions the formation of higher-order moral 
principles of humanity. This is also dealt with Hume’s assistance. Since 
human beings have compassion for others, recognizing the evil that peo-
309Recenzije • Book Reviews 
ple do to each other awakens empathy for the injured; the observer identi-
fies himself with the sufferer and in some way feels his pain. This creates 
a sense of moral recognition of others as moral individuals equal to us.
Having shown that God is not needed in ethics, Howson proceeds 
to argue that God is not needed to explain consciousness either, and for 
that purpose he relies on functionalist theories and advocates strong AI. 
Similarly, the aesthetics and artistic sense are reduced to neurophysiologi-
cal processes. Howson uses data obtained from the neuroscience research 
which showed that there are centres in the brain that tend to harmony, 
strive to proportionality, etc. One wonders whether this can be a complete 
explanation of Bach’s musical creations, for instance, even if one agrees 
that God need not enter the correct explanation.
The final, eighth chapter brings Patrick Grim’s argument for logical 
impossibility of God’s omniscience. As Grim points out, if the proposition 
“1) God doesn’t believe that 1) is true” is true, then God doesn’t believe 
it, and since God is omniscient, 1) is false. Hence 1) is false. Hence God 
believes that 1) is true, and since he is omniscient, 1) must therefore be 
true. Contradiction. Howson could also have mentioned the lack of God’s 
knowledge of spatiotemporal entities, given that God is unextended and 
eternal, and so on.
 This book is unlikely to change anyone’s mind. Atheists will find 
themes familiar from Dawkins, Stenger and Krauss, with some extra philo-
sophical sophistication and familiarity with the history of philosophy, 
whereas theists will find the book disappointingly one-sided, despite its 
evident sophistication and erudition at places. Pantheists, by contrast, will 
find nothing of interest in this book.
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